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Abstract
The land-locked north China province of Shanxi, identified in 1870 by the
geologist Baron Richthofen as ‘one of the most remarkable coal and iron regions in
the world’, was the site of a provincially–defined national movement far removed
from the better–studied treaty ports and their articulate and prolific nationalists.
This late-Qing provincialism may be read as a mediating symbol of an emerging
national consciousness.
Social tensions were exacerbated by external challenges brought by foreign
agents, and their Chinese collaborators, of cultural and economic imperialism.
Opposition to missionaries and Chinese Christians had begun as early as the
1860s. In 1898 the British Pekin Syndicate and its extra-provincial Chinese
associates, with the backing of the central government, secured rights to Shanxi’s
rich coal and iron resources. These rights were ceded back ten years later
after a successful ‘rights-recovery’ movement that possesses similarities to (but
also significant differences from) the well-studied oppositional movements in
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hunan, and Shandong in the period 1905–1911. The duration
of Shanxi’s struggle, along with its extra-bureaucratic elite activism, popular
mobilization, and cooperation with Beijing, makes its rights-recovery movement
distinctive. The rhetoric and practices of the movement, which began before
the Boxer Uprising of 1900 and reflects the rhetorical influence of these earlier
protests, contributed to a strong regional solidarity that was backed by central
state authority. There were various patterns of protest, one indigenous and
provincial, one extra-provincial and nationalist, that interacted in the period
1902–1908. Provincial activists, including merchants, peasants, students, degreeholders, and officials, insisted that Shanxi’s coal was for the use of the community,
the province, and the nation on terms established by and for the people of Shanxi.
In their victory, localism, provincialism, and the national project, had come
together.
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Introduction
Writing from Beijing in June 1870, the eminent and well-respected
geologist and geographer Baron Richthofen informed the Western
business community in Shanghai that the land-locked north China
province of Shanxi, which he had just surveyed, ‘is one of the most
remarkable coal and iron regions in the world’. He went on to write
‘that the world, at the present rate of consumption, could be supplied
for thousands of years from Shansi [Shanxi] alone’.1 These initial
findings were published in 1870 and reprinted in 1875; Richthofen’s
Shanxi report also appeared in compilations published in 1870 and
1872.2 By 1873 Parliament had discussed Shanxi’s coal.3 A quarter
1

Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, Baron Richthofen’s Letters, 1870–1872 (Shanghai,
1872), p. 43. Richthofen’s investigations in Shanxi and elsewhere were done on
behalf of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce. Richthofen began his Shanxi
survey in April 1870, beginning at the border between Shanxi and Henan at Zezhou
Prefecture. Richthofen then travelled towards the Fen River at Pingyang, went upriver
to the plain south of Taiyuan, and to the mountains east of Taiyuan by mid–May
1870. Richthofen published his detailed field notes in 1882. See Baron Ferdinand
von Richthofen, China: Ergebnisse Eigener Reisen und darauf Gergründeter Studien (China:
The Results of My Travels and the Studies Based thereon), Vol. 2, Das Nördliche China
(North China) (Berlin: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer, 1882), pp. 399–453. In this 1882
volume Richthofen calculated that the coal in southern Shanxi alone could supply the
world for 2,100 years. See Richthofen 1882, 439n1.
2
Richthofen’s report on Shanxi, which also included notes on Henan, was published
at least twice in 1870. See Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, Report by Baron von
Richthofen on the Provinces of Honan and Shansi (Shanghai, 1870); Reports on the Provinces of
Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, and Shansi (Shanghai, 1870). The report on Henan and Shanxi
was reprinted in 1875. See Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, Report by Baron von
Richthofen on the Provinces of Honan and Shansi (Shanghai, 1875).
3
Hu Zhonggui, ed., Shanxi meitan gongye jianshi (A brief history of Shanxi’s
coal industry) (Taiyuan: Shanxi kexue jiaoyu chubanshe, 1988), p. 35. England’s
increasing reliance on coal had transformed its economy in the previous three
centuries and by the 1860s several royal commissions had addressed the ‘coal
question’. Would there be adequate supplies for future economic growth? England’s
transition from an advanced organic economy in which all energy flows were solar–
based to a mineral–based energy economy, originally based on coal, was a precondition
for its industrial revolution. See E. A. Wrigley, Continuity, Chance and Change: The
Character of the Industrial Revolution in England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988). The British energy model was transforming the world. In the United States, for
example, it was seized upon by William Palmer, who had studied Britain’s collieries
and coal–consuming industries in 1855 before he explored the Colorado Territory in
America’s West in the summer of 1867. Palmer realized that importing the British
model to Colorado was the key to the region’s economic development. Like Shanxi,
Colorado was a coal–rich, high–altitude, dry region without access to inexpensive
water transport. Colorado’s transformation from an organic–energy economy into
a mineral–intensive economy began in the 1870s. See Thomas G. Andrews, Killing
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of a century later much of this critical energy resource, one of
the most extensive coal reserves in the world,4 was claimed by the
Pekin Syndicate. Founded in 1897 with Lord Rothschild as principal
shareholder, the Pekin Syndicate, with the support of the British
government, sought and gained mining rights to Shanxi’s coal in May
1898.5
In a vivid demonstration of its knowledge and power the West soon
began its preparation to exploit this natural resource, and yet, within
ten years, the people of Shanxi had used this same knowledge, even
paraphrasing Richthofen or his popularizers like Lord Beresford and
Brooks Adams,6 not as a tool for resource exploitation, but rather as

for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
The British model came to China in general, and Shanxi in particular, about the
same time. See Tim Wright, Coal Mining in China’s Economy and Society, 1895–1937
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 36. China, however, remained an
advanced organic economy for decades to come, but by 1990 its coal production was
the largest in the world. See Vaclav Smil, Energy in World History (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1994), p. 186. Richthofen’s vision of extracting Shanxi’s mineral
wealth was finally realized, but the coal would stay in China, where a third of all coal
consumed worldwide is being used in an increasingly mineral–based energy economy
in the twenty–first century. See Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future
of Coal: Options for a Carbon–Constrained World (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 2007), pp. 63–64. For a popular account of the domestic realities,
including a firsthand look at Shanxi, and the global implications of the post–1949
transformation of China’s energy economy, see Barbara Freese, Coal: A Human History
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing, 2003), pp. 199–231.
4
George Babcock Cressey, China’s Geographic Foundations: A Survey of the Land and Its
People (New York: McGraw–Hill, 1934), p. 113. Cressey suggested that north China’s
coal reserves (along with America’s Appalachian region and the lower Rhine River
valley in Europe) were among the top three. More recent estimates put 80 per cent
of the world’s most extensive reserves in Russia, the United States and China. A
1930s geological survey of China’s known reserves estimated that 50 per cent were in
Shanxi. See Smil, p. 218; Wright, p. 80. Smil suggests that the ‘world’s coal resources
could last for almost 500 years at the 1990 rate of extraction.’ See Smil, p. 218.
5
E. W. Edwards, British Diplomacy and Finance in China, 1895–1914 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 32–33; Hu Zhonggui, ed., Shanxi meitan gongye jianshi
(A brief history of Shanxi’s coal industry) (Taiyuan: Shanxi kexue jiaoyu chubanshe,
1988), p. 36; for a text of the agreement see John V. A. MacMurray, comp. and ed.,
Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894–1919, vol. 1 (Manchu Period
(1894–1911) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), pp. 700–702.
6
This knowledge about Shanxi became commonplace by the turn of the century.
Lord Beresford, in his 1899 comments about the British Pekin Syndicate, reported
that Shanxi coal and iron fields could well be the largest in the world. See Lord Charles
William Beresford, The Break–up of China; with an account of its present commerce, currency,
waterways, armies, railways, politics, and future prospects (New York: Harper, 1899), p. 313.
A few years later Brooks Adams, brother of Henry Adams and a friend of US Secretary
of State, John Hay, mentioned Richthofen’s assessment that southern Shanxi had the
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a potent political symbol to use against the West. Their power came
not from financial institutions or military units but from the people.
Shanxi was the site of a provincially–defined national movement far
removed from the better–studied treaty ports and their articulate and
prolific nationalists. This late-Qing provincialism may be read as a
mediating symbol of an emerging national consciousness; it is not an
easy terrain to explore. As Eric Hobsbawm points out, there is a dense
fog that surrounds questions about the national consciousness of men
and women whose primary concerns are those of daily survival.7 My
evidence, while it does not allow access to the interior musings of
peasants in Shanxi, does document action from which may be inferred
a developing national consciousness. Elite actors, some of whom may
be taken as spokesmen for larger community concerns, have left
brief examples of rhetorical affirmations of community, province,
and nation. These traces, however, may not fit into the dominant
genre of nationalist discourse to which we have become accustomed
when discussing the origins of Chinese nationalism. In particular, the
race and language–oriented arguments for defining nations that were
sweeping Europe in the late–nineteenth century and were dutifully
interpreted by activists like Liang Qichao and Zhang Binglin are not
to be found in Shanxi, but their absence alone should not be taken as
evidence for the lack of a national consciousness among the people of
Shanxi.8
A more instructive Western parallel comes from an earlier period
in the nineteenth century when the ‘national question’ was discussed
in economic terms. Alexander Hamilton, for example, stressed the
‘richest beds of coal and iron now known to exist, and undeveloped, in the world’.
See Brooks Adams, The New Empire (New York: Macmillan, 1903), p. 189. Adams
went on to declare: ‘The greatest prize of modern times is northern China’ (p. 190).
For another precise reference to Richthofen’s estimate see E. H. Edwards, Fire and
Sword in Shansi: The Story of the Martyrdom of Foreigners and Chinese Christians (New York:
Revell, 1903), p. 38. Edwards opens his book: ‘Long before the eventful year 1900 the
province of Shansi had attracted the attention of travellers, scientists, and capitalists
by its abounding mineral wealth, first brought to the knowledge of the world by the
explorations of Baron von Richthofen’ (p. 33).
7
E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 79.
8
For a similar argument, based on a study of Hunan intellectual history, see
Stephen R. Platt, Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2007). For an overview of the extensive literature
on nationalism in modern Chinese history see Zhao Suisheng, A Nation–State by
Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 2004).
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importance of the links between nation, state, and economy and
argued for state protection of national economies. Friedrich List,
one of the foremost proponents of what might be called economic
nationalism, stressed the importance of a ‘national economy’ or a
‘people’s economy’ as he argued against the free-trade tenets of
political economists like Adam Smith.9
As Shanxi’s economic fortunes declined and foreign influences
increased a multi-class opposition to the concession granted in 1898
emerged. The rhetoric and practices of this movement demonstrate
clearly how strong regional solidarity, especially when backed by
central state authority, could combine for what might be called
a nationalist triumph. Peasants, students, merchants, and degreeholders were participants and Shanxi bankers raised part of the
capital needed to compensate the syndicate. Moreover, this particular
rights-recovery movement, which possesses similarities to, but also
significant differences from, the well-studied oppositional movements
in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hunan, and Shandong in the period 1905–
1911, is evidence of understudied nuances of extra-bureaucratic elite
activism and popular mobilization in late-Qing China.
The best-studied rights-recovery movement (shouhui liquan), which
refers to both mining and railroad concessions, took place in the lower
Yangzi region and was led by well-known and eminent gentrymen
and merchants like Zhang Jian, Tang Shouqian, and Li Houyou. The
movement in Zhejiang and Jiangsu dates to 1903, when Chinese
students in Japan and Zhejiangese officials in Beijing protested against
foreign influence and control of a planned railroad between Hangzhou
and Suzhou. These protests became better-organized and publicized
beginning in 1905.10
A similar protest in Guangdong, Hunan, and Hubei concerned the
proposed railroad between Canton and Hankou. In this case the
leaders of the movement were primarily provincial officials like Zhang
Zhidong, rather than provincial elite. Railway rights were returned to
the Chinese in 1905 after a payment, made possible by a foreign loan,
was made by Zhang Zhidong; the loan was repaid from the provincial

9

Hobsbawm, pp. 29–30.
See Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China:
Zhejiang Province, 1865–1911 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1986),
pp. 263–296; Madeleine Chi, ‘Shanghai–Hangchow–Ningpo Railway Loan: A Case
Study of the Rights Recovery Movement’, Modern Asian Studies 7 (1973): 85–106.
10
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treasuries of Hunan and Hubei.11 Unlike the movement in Jiangsu
and Zhejiang, provincial elite participation was less central. These
features can also be found in the mining-rights-recovery movement in
Shandong. This movement, which sought to ensure Chinese access to
most of the sixty-li zone in Shandong bisected by a planned Germanbuilt railroad as well as five large areas elsewhere, won the recognition
that Chinese-owned mines, using modern technology if desired, could
be operated in these zones. The price tag for Chinese access to the
five large zones cost the province 340,000 taels and 210,000 Chinese
dollars.12
Li Enhan categorized the various mining-rights movements as
follows: (1) concessions in Zhejiang and Sichuan that were abrogated
because terms in the original contract were not met; (2) voluntary
renunciation of rights such as the German decision in Shandong’s
sixty-li zone between Qingdao and Ji’nan; and (3) the type of
movement found in Shanxi, Anhui, Hunan, and other German areas
in Shandong that ended after a negotiated redemption fee was paid
by the Chinese.13
The Shanxi rights-recovery movement shared with these various
movements the nationalistic rhetoric characteristic of the period
1905–1911, the cooperation of provincial officials, gentry, merchants,
new-style students, and fellow provincials in Beijing, and an emphasis
on blocking close foreign involvement in railway and mining projects.
But there were also important differences: (1) a lineage to protests
taking place during and before 1900; (2) mobilization that included
active participation of non-elite elements; and (3) relative unanimity
within the provincial elite, including both gentrymen and the
merchant elite. Li Enhan’s treatment of the Shanxi movement stresses
the similarities (although he glances over the gentry and student
mobilization), but does not explore the differences just noted.14

11
Daniel H. Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih–tung and the Issues of
a New Age, 1895–1909 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1978),
pp. 163–184.
12
See John E. Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism: Germany in Shantung
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 179–191; En–han,
Lee [Li Enhan], ‘China’s Response to Foreign Investment in Her Mining Industry
(1902–1911),’ Journal of Asian Studies 28 (1968): 66.
13
Ibid., p. 73.
14
Li’s 1963 book included a chapter on the pre–1905 period. See Li Enhan, Wan–
Qing de shouhui kuangquan yundong (The movement to recover mining rights in the late
Qing) (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1963), pp. 201–221.
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The questions explored here—how and by whom Shanxi’s vast coal
reserves should be exploited—emerged in the context of an economic
depression in 1890s Shanxi when the interconnection of its regional
economy with national and international networks, once a strength,
became a source of weakness. The province’s high-quality iron
products, its national network of bankers, and its role in transshipping
and marketing goods to Mongolia and Russia from elsewhere in China,
which had contributed to a flourishing economy in the mid-nineteenth
century, were adversely affected as Shanxi’s economy suffered a severe
downturn. Among the contributing factors were the import of cheaper
Western or Western-style goods that became increasingly available
after 1842 in Shanxi, and the reorganization of national public finance
at the turn of the century that affected the fortunes of Shanxi’s
bankers.15

Social Context
Shanxi communities suffered a crisis of legitimacy which had been
developing in social, cultural, and moral arenas in the years following
the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 and the Convention
of Beijing in 1860, when Catholic and then Protestant missionaries
began to use extraterritorial rights and new Chinese laws governing
religious toleration to undermine the ritual life of Shanxi villagers.
This crisis, endemic during the final decades of the nineteenth century,
contributed to the explosion of violence in Shanxi in 1900, and was
definitively resolved in the post–Boxer era in a way that served to
estrange the rural elite, and the communities they led, from the
state.16 Shanxi’s urban-based bankers, however, grew in importance.
The wealth and influence of merchant capital in Shanxi, particularly
that of its network of bankers both within the province and throughout
15
For an exploration of Shanxi’s wealth and influence prior to the devastating
famine of 1876–1879 see Kathryn Edgerton–Tarpley, Tears from Iron: Cultural Responses
to Famine in Nineteenth–century China (Berkeley, California: University of California
Press, 2008). Additional detail on events between 1840 and 1908 can be found in
Shanxi dashi ji (1840–1985) (A chronology of important events in Shanxi, 1840–1985),
edited by Shanxi sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin
chubanshe, 1987), pp. 1–83.
16
Roger R. Thompson, ‘Twilight of the Gods in the Chinese Countryside:
Christians, Confucians, and the Modernizing State, 1861–1911’, in Christianity in
China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present, edited by Daniel H. Bays (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 53–72.
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China, became quite significant in late-nineteenth century Shanxi, a
development that caused alarm among the less commercially–inclined
elite. As we will see, this wealth and the families represented were key
elements in a provincialist defence of Shanxi’s natural resources that
brought together various strands of political activism in Shanxi.
This interconnection between the national and provincial can also be
seen in the impact of the transformation of China’s method of selecting
its political elite. The abolition of the examination system in China,
announced in 1905, had already been effectively accomplished in
Shanxi’s core regions by 1901 as a consequence of government actions,
mandated by the victorious Allies, taken after the Boxer Uprising.17
The blocking of this avenue to wealth and power contributed to the
quick development of new–style schools that were founded in the
provincial capital beginning in 1902. Degree–holders from throughout
the province became students at the indemnity–funded Shanxi
University, a military academy and agricultural school.18 Alongside
such students could be found those who would never have participated
in the old–style examination system. The best students from both
categories could be awarded government scholarships to continue
their studies in Japan and England.19 In Shanxi, new opportunities for
social mobility identified with new–style school matriculation became
apparent three years in advance of nationwide implementation of new
educational policies.
Shanxi was one of the first provinces (August 1902) to publish a
new–style government gazette in the post–Boxer period.20 Henrietta
Harrison’s research highlights the ways in which news and rumours
circulated in Shanxi and identifies the interaction of these familiar
means of communication with the growth of new-style newspapers
and government gazettes at the turn of the century. Even before the
advent of new–style publications Shanxi’s literate males, who could be
found throughout China in a banking network, and in north China in

17

Shanxi dashi ji, p. 70.
Shanxi dashi ji, pp. 73–74. For a discussion of the programmes and students at
Shanxi University see William E. Soothill, Timothy Richard of China: Seer, statesman,
missionary and the most disinterested adviser the Chinese ever had (London: Seeley, Service,
1924), pp. 253–270.
19
In the autumn of 1904 Governor Zhang Zengyang sent 50 students to Japan.
See Shanxi dashi ji, p. 75. In the spring of 1907 25 graduates from Shanxi University
were sent to England for a five–year course of study. See Shanxi dashi ji, p. 82; The
Times, 3 June, 1907, p. 5; Soothill, p. 266.
20
Shanxi dashi ji, p. 74.
18
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particular in a clerking network, kept the province informed of extraprovincial news through their letter–writing. Once in Shanxi this news
could be spread further along informal networks of communication.21
Formal communication between government offices took place and
official notices were posted on walls outside government compounds.
Formally and informally, news and information from local, provincial,
and national sources circulated in Shanxi. When increased literacy
and schooling affected Shanxi, it enhanced social communication in
an environment that could scarcely be called parochial.
However, there was social tension in Shanxi exacerbated by external
challenges of cultural and economic imperialism brought by foreign
agents and their Chinese collaborators. The spirited defense by some
Shanxi natives of symbolic and economic resources was opposed by
other Shanxi persons, and both sides had extra-provincial allies.
These struggles had implications for Shanxi’s relationship with central
authority in China as well as for China’s international relationships. By
exploring the articulation of these conflicts, expressed in both national
and provincial terms, we can trace the development of a fruitful
approach to nation–building that is predicated on strong provincial,
but not necessarily parochial, loyalties.
Let us turn, then, to the question of Shanxi’s coal and who should
control its exploitation.

Shanxi and the Pekin Syndicate, 1898–1901
As early as 1896 the Qing government encouraged iron mining in
Shanxi and, by December 1896, a commercial enterprise dedicated
to coal and iron mining had been established. On 14 July, 1897, the
Shanxi governor, Hu Pinzhi, memorialized a recommendation to first
build a railroad into Shanxi in order to develop mining enterprises.22
Hu knew that Shanxi’s rich coal resources could contribute to national
development, so he was committed to importing Western mining
techniques and extra-provincial capital resources in order to develop
mines and to build the railroads to bring the coal to market.23 For
21
Henrietta Harrison, ‘Newspapers and Nationalism in Rural China, 1890–1929,’
Past and Present 166 (2000): 181–204.
22
Shanxi dashi ji, pp. 58–59.
23
Mi Rucheng, ed., Zhongguo jindai tielu shi ziliao, 1863–1911 (Source materials
on the history of railways in modern China, 1863–1911) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1963), vol. 2, p. 411.
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these reasons Hu Pinzhi allowed two extra-provincials, Liu E and Fang
Xiaojie, to form the Jinfeng Company (Jinfeng gongsi) for the purpose of
borrowing money from foreign banks in order to develop mining in the
central-east area in which Yu County and Pingding Department were
located, and in the southeastern prefectures of Lu’an and Zezhou.24
Liu E, better known as author of The Travels of Lao Can (Laocan youji),
had ties to Li Hongzhang’s well-connected protégé, Ma Jianzhong. By
the end of 1897 Liu E was negotiating an agreement between Shanxi
officials associated with the province’s Commercial Affairs Bureau
(Shangwu ju) and the Pekin Syndicate.25
There was opposition almost immediately. On 28 February, 1898
a censor named Xu Shuming memorialized that Shanxi’s mining and
railroad rights should be returned to the gentry and people (shenmin).26
Xu was concerned about the strategic implications for a defence
of Beijing presented by the prospect of a railroad in Shanxi and
also thought that merchant-dominated exploitation of Shanxi’s coal
resources would be detrimental to the economic interests of Shanxi’s
gentry and people. Xu’s was one of a half-dozen similar petitions and
memorials submitted in early 1898. Particular concern was expressed
about the economic effect on small-scale mining operations in the
areas being discussed for the concession.27
Hu Pinzhi was ordered to comment,28 Liu E and his associate
were pushed aside by imperial edict, and the Commercial Affairs
Bureau took over the Jinfeng Company.29 But the concession-hunting
continued and on 17 May, 1898 imperial approval was given to a
20-article agreement that had been reached between the Shanxi
Commercial Affairs Bureau and the Pekin Syndicate. The agreement
was signed on 21 May. The syndicate was granted rights to mine in
Lu’an Prefecture (Changzhi), Zezhou Prefecture (Jincheng), Pingding
Department, Yu County, and also in Pingyang Prefecture (Linfen)
in central Shanxi, in return for tax payments, profit-sharing, and a
promise to turn the operations over to the Chinese after 60 years.30
24

Shanxi dashi ji, p. 59.
Hu, 36; Frank H. H. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of Imperialism and War:
Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth, Vol. 2 of The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 302.
26
For the text see Mi, vol. 2, pp. 406–407. The Zongli yamen summarized the
controversy in a memorial rescripted on 17 May, 1898. See Mi, vol. 2, pp. 412–414.
27
Mi, vol. 2, p. 407.
28
Shanxi dashi ji, p. 60.
29
Mi, vol. 2, pp. 409, 414.
30
MacMurray, vol. 1, pp. 700–702; Hu, p. 36.
25
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It should come as no surprise that these rich coal fields were the ones
explored and first publicized by Baron Richthofen. A second agreement
with the Pekin Syndicate, allowing a short rail line to be built in
northern Henan and southern Shanxi that would allow shipment of
Shanxi coal to rail and water junctions, was also signed in 1898.31 With
these agreements in hand the syndicate soon had subscribed capital
of £1,520,000, and set to work.32 In another development, a rail line
between Zhengding in Zhili and Taiyuan, Shanxi’s capital, that would
run through a high-quality anthracite coal region in Pingding was also
specified in an agreement signed with Russia in 1898.33 Engineering
parties, which had been surveying Shanxi and northern Henan in
1897, continued their work.34 In 1898 the Zhengding-Taiyuan line
was surveyed35 and in 1899 J. H. G. Glass headed a Pekin Syndicate
expedition sent to verify the estimates of Shanxi’s coal and iron
deposits, and to look for petroleum. In addition, the Glass party was
charged with making rough surveys for railroad routes that would
connect the mines with navigable water routes. The party traversed
Shanxi from north to south and completed a favourable report by
November 1899.36
We can see, then, how in 1896 Western-inspired business goals
began directly to affect Shanxi. Beginning with a call by the governor
to develop Shanxi’s resources in that year, in quick order Shanxi’s
mineral rights had been signed away and the building of railroads
had been approved. Shanxi officials, well-connected extra-provincial
Chinese, reform-minded officials like Li Hongzhang, and Westerners,
all played a role. But these collaborators and Westerners were opposed
almost immediately, first by officials in Beijing and soon by hundreds
of gentrymen and merchants in Shanxi who were pleading that mining
and railroad projects should be temporarily halted. Their protests, first
31
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voiced in early 1898, continued into 1899 as preparations continued.
For example, the provincial treasurer, He Shu, serving as acting
governor in 1899, explained in a memorial the socio-economic context
of mining in Shanxi and why these proposed developments would
be detrimental. He said that Shanxi’s resources were few but that
coal and iron were abundant, especially in the areas affected by the
Pekin Syndicate’s concession. There was no advantage, he argued, in
adopting Western mining techniques. He Shu’s analysis and warning,
written in December 1899, is worth quoting:
[Some] local people use local methods to mine and the products are used for
their own daily purposes. Other uses for the mines have to do with the slack
season in the agricultural year, when poor people form together into bands
that seek out new mines that they mine together and the amounts gained
are very small. There are also wealthy families who amass capital resources
that are used to mine relatively large-scale operations, but frequently their
gains don’t make up for their losses. . . . Now the people of Shanxi (Jinmin) are
talking about these railroad and mining projects and they are very anxious
about it. The people in the interior of China are not the same as those who
live along the Yangzi and the coast. We are at a dangerous pass and must not
take this lightly. Your minister is particularly concerned about those who are
agitated.37

He Shu claimed that the people were aware of, and concerned
about, these projects. There is evidence from Zezhou Prefecture, one
of the syndicate’s concession areas in southeastern Shanxi and the
first coal region explored by Richthofen in 1870, that supports He
Shu’s contention. Agents of the Pekin Syndicate, presumably the Glass
expedition, had spent time in Zezhou in 1899 and missionaries fleeing
Shanxi in 1900 passed through these same villages. Village elders
quieted howling mobs only after Alexander R. Saunders, a missionary
associated with the China Inland Mission, persuaded them that he
was a missionary, not a Pekin Syndicate agent—he was spared.38
37

He Shu memorial GX25/11/18. See Mi Rucheng, vol. 2, pp. 417–418.
Saunders’ 18 August, 1900 letter, written while he was in the Yangzi River treaty
port of Hankou, was published in The Times on 29 September, 1900. The first word
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that he was another person’. See North China Herald, 29 August, 1900, p. 450.
38

http://journals.cambridge.org

Downloaded: 12 May 2014

IP address: 140.160.178.168

‘IF SHANXI’S COAL IS LOST, THEN SHANXI IS LOST!’

1273

Beijing had known the problem in Shanxi was growing more serious
in the months after He Shu’s December 1899 warning. Moreover,
the seriousness of the Pekin Syndicate was becoming more apparent.
Within months of the completion of the Glass report a 6 March, 1900
prospectus announced the sale of more ‘Shansi shares.’ The prospectus
stated, according to The Times, that the Pekin Syndicate had the ‘sole
right for 60 years to mine coal throughout 20,000 square miles in
Shan-si [Shanxi] province, the richest coal-mining area in the world’.39
A week later Yuxian became Shanxi’s governor.
Yuxian, as had He Shu, warned Beijing about the situation in Shanxi.
In a memorial dated 18 May, 1900 Yuxian argued against the projects,
based on his concerns about their effect on defence and the local
economy. Yuxian also emphasized the strength of elite opposition
to the projects, giving the names of the lead petitioner of three
petitions: one from 192 degree-holders from throughout the province,
one from 28 gentrymen from Yangqu County, the head county of
Taiyuan Prefecture, and one from 430 merchants from Taiyuan City,
the provincial capital. He summarized their concerns, especially their
anticipation that the people’s livelihood (minsheng) would be adversely
affected should the railroad projects be allowed to continue. Yuxian’s
economic concerns were directed in part toward the transportation
sector in Shanxi, which employed myriad porters and carters who came
from Shanxi’s poorer elements. Yuxian was also unhappy with the
prospect of foreign engineers coming in and marking concession areas
that would be off-limits for mining by Chinese.40 Yuxian’s memorial
found a receptive audience in Beijing and a rescript, dated 30 May
that was sent along with copies of the petitions and Yuxian’s memorial
to the Zongli yamen (Chinese Foreign Office) instructed the Zongli
yamen to tell Western ministers that both railroad and mining projects
in Shanxi must cease.41 Yuxian’s memorial was rescripted the day after
the British legation had asked the yamen to direct Shanxi officials to
issue a document that would guarantee the safe passage of an English
engineer associated with the Pekin Syndicate who was planning to
enter from Henan. On 3 June, the Zongli yamen simply asked the
British to postpone the trip to Shanxi, but on 6 June, after receipt of

39
40
41
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Yuxian memorial GX26/4/20. See Mi, vol. 2, pp. 418–419.
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Yuian’s memorial and the imperial rescript, the Zongli yamen directed
that the work itself in Shanxi be postponed.42
At this point rights-recovery advocates appeared to have gained
the upper hand. While there is little evidence that suggests an
organizational basis deserving of the label ‘movement,’ there is
evidence of significant and widespread elite opposition throughout
Shanxi in general, and in central Shanxi in particular. These
voices, heard in Beijing through the agency of provincial officials,
sound rational, measured, and community-spirited. For some it was
not necessarily economic modernization, but rather the means of
accomplishing this laudable goal, that was the issue.
It would be easy at this point to break the rights-recovery narrative,
since the Boxer Uprising would be the dominant feature in the
months to come. But Alexander Saunder’s report, when combined
with a new analysis of events in Shanxi from late June 1900 to April
1901, suggests significant continuities. From the perspective of Shanxi
officials, who knew China was at war with the Allies, the province
was both a strategic and tactical linchpin in the successful strategy
of keeping the Qing court out of the military grasp of foreigners.
Governor Yuxian, whom we have seen supporting opponents of the
Pekin Syndicate, mobilized local militias, some of which saw action
along with regular Chinese troops in the defence of the passes linking
Shanxi with the north China plain. This policy of aggressive defence of
Shanxi’s borders lasted until April 1901, when Li Hongzhang finally
convinced the Qing court in Xi’an to issue withdrawal orders.43 Li
Hongzhang, it should be recalled, had been the most senior member
of the faction that had backed the May 1898 agreement with the Pekin
Syndicate.
Further research may yield more clues about this particular source
of violence in Shanxi in 1900, but gaps in the documentary record
make this difficult. One of the most important archival sources, the
relevant published ‘mining archive’ records of the Zongli yamen, is
largely silent for the years 1899–1901. However much anti-Pekin
Syndicate proclivities motivated action in Shanxi in 1900–1901, it
is clear that the Li Hongzhang-brokered surrender in April 1901
42
Yihetuan dang’an shiliao xubian (Continuation of archival materials on the Boxers),
edited by Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan bianji bu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990),
vol. 1, pp. 593–596.
43
Roger R. Thompson, ‘Military Dimensions of the “Boxer Uprising” in Shanxi,
1898–1901’, in Hans van de Ven, ed., Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden: Brill Academic
Publishers, 2000), pp. 288–320.
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re-opened Shanxi to Western interests and influence reminiscent of
the 1898 opening that Li’s protégé had engineered. After the fires had
died down, the victims mourned, and the indemnities set, missionaries
and engineers soon returned to Shanxi and resumed the projects that
had been interrupted, often tragically, in the summer of 1900.44 In
many ways the language of protest remained the same as well, but not
entirely. Of particular interest is the way in which old and new became
intertwined and how the language of previous conflicts, seemingly
unrelated to the rights-recovery movement, may have influenced the
discussions of 1902–1908. Although the discourse of 1905–1907 in
particular echoed language heard in Shanxi since at least 1861, when
opposition to the return of Catholic missionaries was voiced, it also
reflected more recent influences, especially those coming from outside
the province.
Here is evidence of a provincially-defined national movement, one
that expressed in provincial terms an economic nationalism. Of
course the protagonists in this struggle acted on the basis of complex
motivations, but it is clear that for some a broader vision of a national
project of economic modernization was part of this complex. There
was also broad social composition to this movement. When elite
activists talked about the ‘people’, this was not mere abstraction.
The concerns of peasant-miners and porters were being expressed
by the elite and their participation was sought and sometimes won.
Surely the peasant-miners climbing mountainsides in Yangquan and
claiming land for a Chinese company, peasant-miners who may have
glimpsed British flags being used as survey markers by Pekin Syndicate
agents in Pingding in the autumn of 1905, must have known that
inaction on their part would insure the likelihood of foreign control?45
Other evidence for the broad social composition of the movement
can be found in the reported refusal of Shanxi labourers to work on
the Zhengding-Taiyuan line and the observation by a well-informed
Westerner living in Shanxi that the agitation in 1906 was resonating
with the people and that the struggle to regain Shanxi’s rights could

44
See Thompson, ‘Military Dimensions’. For a discussion of Yuxian and the
Western representation of his actions in Shanxi see Roger R. Thompson, ‘Reporting
the Taiyuan Massacre: Culture and Politics in the China War of 1900’, in Robert
Bickers and R. G. Tiedemann, eds., The Boxers, China, and the World (Lanham, Maryland:
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45
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easily embroil the whole province.46 In word and deed the elite and
peasants alike were simultaneously expressing local, provincial, and
national concerns.

The Rights-recovery Movement, 1902–1908
The support of anti-Pekin Syndicate proponents in Beijing that had
been won just before the beginning of the Boxer Uprising may have
no longer been evident, but natives in Shanxi were undeterred in
their continuing struggle to protect Shanxi’s coal and iron resources
from the grasping hands of foreigners. By February 1903 Governor
Zhao Erxun told the court that not only was he encouraging mining
activities in areas outside the Pekin Syndicate concession, but also
that a company (Feng Jin kuangwu zong gongsi) headed by the wealthy
Shanxi banker Qu Benqiao (Qi County, Taiyuan Prefecture) had been
established to begin mining operations.47 Qu’s name would re-appear
in succeeding years, most notably with fund-raising that finally led to
the return of mining rights to Shanxi.
In another indication of the continuities across 1900 we should
note that in Shanghai a second edition of Baron Richthofen’s Letters,
1870–1872 was published in 1903. The third item in this volume,
Richthofen’s 1870 report on Shanxi’s rich mineral resources, was
available once again for Western readers.48 Much had changed in
China in the 30 years since the volume was first published and this
time there were many more Chinese able to read Richthofen’s letters
and to report on their contents to other Chinese. The West’s monopoly
on knowledge was growing smaller.
In 1904 efforts continued in the provincial yamen to restore
some measure of control, as Governor Zhang Zengyang encouraged
localities in Shanxi to form mining societies (kuangchan gonghui) that
would give landowners willing to sell to the Pekin Syndicate a Chinese
alternative.49 Among the better-documented of these societies is the

46
See Lo Hui–min, ed., The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 375, 392–393.
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one established in Pingding; there were also ones established in
Taiyuan and, in December 1905, in Lu’an.50
The Pingding society’s regulations followed those of the Taiyuan
society. The goals of these societies were to prevent foreign ownership
of Shanxi mines and also to amass capital in order to further develop
indigenous mining in the province. The idea was that mine lands would
be registered with the society and be sheltered as nominal public
property (gongchan). Officials and people working together would be
able to protect (baoshou) Shanxi’s precious natural resources through
vigilance and pooling capital. The apparent public-mindedness of the
society contrasted with its anticipated foes: those Chinese who were
renting or selling land to foreigners or who were acting as proxies. In
such cases the regulations stated that the contracts should be cancelled
and the land handed over to officials. While the people responsible
for alienating Shanxi’s resources were to be severely punished, this
recognition of conflicts within Shanxi society was balanced by its
stated positive goals: to unite the people’s feelings and protect their
resources.51
The actual carrying out of this mission appears to have been
delegated to companies formed under the society’s auspices. For
example in Yangquan, an important mining region near the ShanxiZhili border in Pingding, grass-roots organizational work was carried
out by the Guben Company (Guben gongsi), so named to highlight the
twin functions of the company: to calm the people and to raise capital
so that Shanxi people could carry out mining activities on their own.
Two miners recalled these efforts, which were reportedly led by gentrymerchants who directed bands of miner-peasants from specific villages
to stake out territory by carving the characters for ‘guben’ on desired
mountain tops. This popular mobilization, under the guidance of the
local elite and the provincial government, placed Shanxi yet again on
the path towards confrontation with the West and the Pekin Syndicate.
Yangquan will be used to illustrate the deepening of this conflict, but
similar companies were also formed in Shouyang to the west, Jincheng
(Zezhou) in the southeast, and elsewhere in Pingding Department.52
These localized efforts could become part of a broader
organizational reach when well-connected and regionally-oriented
50
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51
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companies stepped in. For example, the Yangquan villages that
contributed to the efforts of the Guben Company were re-organized
under the auspices of the Shanxi Tongji Kuangwu Company (Tongji
kuangwu gongsi), established in February, 1905. Headquartered in
Taiyuan, the company had branches in places like Pingding and
Zezhou. This company encouraged the prospecting and buying of
mine lands in Shanxi that had already been underway. The prejudice
against foreigners remained, for only Chinese could be shareholders.
But there was increasing openness to extra-provincials. For example,
the extra-provincial financing of the claims-staking efforts undertaken
in Yangquan’s villages by the Tongji Kuangwu Company in 1905 was
unproblematic. At the same time the Tongji Kuangwu Company was
restricting employment opportunities to Shanxi natives.53 (But we can
also infer an openness to extra-provincial contributions in a name-list
of one of the 1905 student petitions, to be discussed below, that gives
extra-provincial origins for at least five percent of the signatories.54 )
Pingding’s Yangquan area illustrates the ambitions of both
provincial and local elites and the scale of their efforts. Thirty-three
villages were mobilized to stake out claims to mining areas. With
20,000 taels provided by Yuan Shikai, along with Zhili and Shanghai
merchants, and an additional 10,000 taels raised in Shanxi, the Tongji
Kuangwu Company soon laid claim to about 100 square miles of
mining areas in Pingding in early 1905.55 Almost certainly one of
the gentry-merchants in Pingding organizing these efforts was one
Song Ruyang, who came to the attention of Pekin Syndicate engineers
dispatched to the area in early 1905. Although we know that Song
was not alone in this well-organized undertaking, it was his village
and his mine-staking that was reported to George Jamieson, the
Pekin Syndicate’s agent in Beijing, and to the Chinese metropolitan
authorities.56
A crisis that had been simmering heated up in July 1905 as work
on the Zhengding-Taiyuan railroad reached Yangquan (Pingding
department), the most troubled mining area, and a place that was
destined to be a major stop on the new line. A petition drafted by
a Pingding gentryman in the autumn of 1905 summarized recent
events and glossed over local issues in a way worthy of close scrutiny.
53
54
55
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Cao Shutian, the lead petitioner of the joint petition, wrote that
the original agreement between the Pekin Syndicate and the Shanxi
Commercial Affairs Bureau, the agreement brokered by Liu E that
was re-written along lines favoured by authorities in Beijing, had given
the syndicate the responsibility to carry out, on the bureau’s behalf,
mining enterprises in areas where mines were closed and no longer
worked or in areas where mines could not be worked with familiar
techniques. But, as Cao continued:
This fall a Pekin Syndicate person, who had only a guarantee of a safe
passage to enter the district, suddenly began posting flags and drawing up
engineering maps. If a mine wasn’t open then it couldn’t be worked by [Shanxi
persons] in the future. . . . If a mine was already being worked, then orders
were given to stop. This is clearly an attempt to encroach upon the people’s
property (minchan). These actions, which astonished the people and disturbed
peace and order, disregard the stipulations in the joint agreement and are
self-serving and coercive. The people are terrified and their criticisms are
mounting; it is very difficult to anticipate whether or not they might suddenly
rise up.57

Among the issues that infuriated Cao and his fellow petitioners
was the demand made by George Jamieson that the syndicate had
virtual monopoly rights in concession areas. Although the syndicate
did not have the right to expropriate native mines—it was allowed to
purchase or lease fields only when owners were willing—it insisted
that new mining operations could not be started by the Chinese
in these areas. There were disputes over the interpretation of key
clauses in the 1898 agreement. For example, the distinction between
ongoing and new mining developments was shown to be problematic
by Chinese officials, who explained that traditional mining was often
done intermittently during the course of the agricultural season so
that unworked mines were not necessarily closed mines. It did not
help matters that the newly-formed Chinese mining companies in
Shanxi were exploiting these ambiguities as the rail line drew closer
to the coal fields.58
At the same time that these new rhetorical stances were being
developed and influencing most participants, there is evidence of
continuities in the methods used by older participants in the
movement. The petitioning of officials by the elite in 1898–1900
(petitions that would be forwarded to Beijing) was also done after
57
58
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1900. But this familiar tactic took an interesting twist in 1905 when
a number of degree-holders, mostly shengyuan, comprised just half
of the 407 signatories from Taiyuan’s new-style schools.59 Here is
a good example of the blurring of lines, in practice, between labels
like ‘traditional degree-holders’ and ‘modern students in new-style
schools’. Among the 407 signatories were 52 normal school students,
25 of whom were commoners.60 This blurring of boundaries came
earlier to Shanxi than most other places in China because of the
temporary ban on civil service examinations in almost two dozen
Shanxi towns and cities, including Taiyuan and Datong, imposed by
the Boxer Protocol of 1901.61 It may well have been true in Shanxi
that the new-style schools established in the province brought together
degree-holders and commoners in ways that conferred prestige to the
institutions while at the same time providing the opportunity for rapid
upward social mobility to commoners who were now on a relatively
equal footing with their degree-holding classmates.
The indirect role of the provincial government, when combined
with the clear interest on the part of the Shanxi elite, including
Shanxi natives who were officials in Beijing, meant the potential for
well-organized protest was great. Petitions like Cao’s were written
by various groups to different levels of the government, a familiar
tactic used by the elite in Shanxi. For example, 343 petitioners, led by
Hanlin scholars and other degree-holders, petitioned the governor in
the autumn of 1905. They claimed to be struggling for their province’s
commercial advantage and to have united all the citizens (guomin) in
Shanxi in this struggle to preserve Shanxi’s sovereignty (zhuquan).62
(In a telling locution, translated here literally, they referred to all
Shanxi’s people as ‘Shanxi all-province citizens’ [Shanxi quansheng
guomin]).63 The spirit of Cao and his fellow petitioners was echoed
by the 1,014 students from Shanxi’s growing network of new-style
schools in Taiyuan who expressed similar sentiments.64 The students
cried out in their joint petition: ‘If Shanxi’s coal is lost, then Shanxi
is lost’.65 This petition also includes evidence of how Richthofen’s
1870 statement, now commonplace among Westerners, also informed
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
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the discussion of Chinese, for there appears the figure of Shanxi’s
supplies being sufficient for ‘several thousand years’.66 The anguish
of Li Peiren, who was a student at the normal school in Taiyuan,67
would become so great that words were not enough. Students from
these Taiyuan schools also went to Pingding to make their own
investigations, disrupted negotiations in Taiyuan between provincial
officials and George Jamieson, arranged various strikes, and agitated
for their cause in the streets of Taiyuan.68 These student protests
continued to be echoed by more senior members of the elite. For
example, late in 1905 253 persons, led by a degree-holding returned
student from Japan, petitioned the governor to end the agreement
with the Pekin Syndicate.69
This is the provincial context for the arrival of emissaries from
Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeng hui), which had been
formed in the summer of 1905 (20 August) and whose emissaries were
in Shanxi by the winter.70 These revolutionaries, as well as reformminded returned students, could influence the drafting of petitions
from late 1905 onwards. We know that Shanxi students attended
meetings in Tokyo with students from other provinces, and together
they protested about the Pekin Syndicate monopoly in Shanxi.71 But
these returned students were but one more element in a very complex
mobilization. Li Peiren, who would become a martyr to the cause, was a
shengyuan (linsheng) who was educated at a new-style school in Shanxi
and signed a 1905 protest petition before he left Shanxi. His example
underscores the importance of using convenient labels like ‘returned
student’ with care, for their activism could have provincial as well
as cosmopolitan roots. Li, and many of his fellow Shanxi students in
Tokyo, were contributing to, as well as witnessing, the nationalization
of a provincial argument. The question in 1906 was how these patterns
of protest, one indigenous and provincial, one extra-provincial and
nationalist, would interact. The former pattern dates to the 1890s

66
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67
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and is the one, ultimately, that spelled success in Shanxi because
these elite activists had access to money. The latter pattern is the
nationalist one popularized by non-Shanxi activists in Tokyo whose
rhetoric turned Shanxi into a symbol of imperialist victimization and
who claimed Shanxi’s coal for their own goals.
Unrest continued into 1906, supported from Beijing, where the
Shanxi native Ma Cunren and several dozen other officials, including
fellow provincials, sent a well-informed petition that reached the
Chinese Foreign Office (Waiwu bu).72 Among the points made in
this petition was an explanation of the problems in Pingding, caused
by the Pekin Syndicate failing to abide by the terms of the 1898
agreement which specified that its operations could only be ‘carried
out in areas where it was welcome’. In Pingding, on the contrary, there
was widespread opposition and many old and new mines were being
occupied by the syndicate without permission.73
Events in 1906 took a tragic and highly-publicized turn in October,
when Li Peiren, the degree-holder from Datong Prefecture in
northeastern Shanxi studying in Tokyo at Hosei University, drowned
himself in protest over Western provocation in Shanxi. Li was hailed
a martyr and a convocation in Tokyo attracted about 1,000 students
(there were about 100 Shanxi students in Japan at the time). Similarlysized crowds soon formed in Shanxi. Li Peiren’s suicide note would
become a highly-charged symbol when it was returned to Shanxi, and
became the focus of rallies held in his honour. In November, over 2,000
students gathered in Taiyuan and, during three days of meetings, they
decided to return to their homes to spread the news about Shanxi’s
plight, to rally for opposition to the Pekin Syndicate, and to raise
money; the Shanxi story was also carried in the national press. The
following month a Pingding rally attracted 1,000 people.74
Meanwhile, agents of the Pekin Syndicate were under pressure from
shareholders to begin mining. On 24 January, 1907, according to The
Times:
[T]he British Government presented to China a demand for compensation
on behalf of the syndicate for £200 a day from January 1 of this year for every

72
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day’s delay by the provincial authorities in issuing a permit for the syndicate
to begin mining operations in the province.75

Following this display of government support the syndicate issued
statements in English and Chinese that repeated the material
included in the March 1900 prospectus and reminded readers that
all Chinese mines opened since 21 May, 1898 should, technically,
be closed down. As long as its monopoly rights were recognized,
the syndicate would demonstrate that it was a ‘true friend, bringing
education, enlightenment, and prosperity to the province of Shan-si
[Shanxi]’.76
While the Pekin Syndicate was working levers of power and
influence in London and Beijing, and trying to present its case
directly to the Chinese, the Shanxi elite refused to back down. Elite
petitioning continued. On 26 March, 1907, for example, a petition
by Shanxi’s gentrymen was made public (xuanbu). It argued that the
Pekin Syndicate’s attempt to monopolize mining operations in Yu,
Pingding, Zezhou, and Lu’an was illegal and mentioned irritation
at the syndicate’s attempt to bar native mine operators from using
modern machinery such as pumps.77 Another document from 1907,
which was associated with gentrymen and merchants (shenmin) from
Taiyuan and elsewhere, suggests how divisive this issue could be within
Shanxi, for it was directed at Chinese who may have been willing to
sell their lands, work in the new mines, or engage in trade with the
syndicate. A total boycott was called for and those who did not comply
were threatened with punishment, including banishment.78
The language used in both patterns of protests post-1900 are
very similar, with references to country (guo), citizen (guomin), and
sovereignty (zhuquan) to name a few of the more frequent and familiar
terms. It is clear that all three terms are being used primarily in
terms of provincial interests and it would be misleading to argue that
by 1907 all rights-recovery activists had somehow subordinated the
provincial to the national. But at the same time it is difficult to gloss
over their statements as arguments for provincial prerogatives at the
expense of the nation. They are arguing simultaneously for province
and nation, confident that protecting Shanxi’s economic self-interest
would ultimately redound to the benefit of China.
75
76
77
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The petitioning Shanxi elite won permission from Shanxi governor
Enshou to establish yet another mining company, this one known
colloquially as the ‘Bao Jin’, or Protect Shanxi, Company. After
provincial permission was received, a Shanxi native in Beijing
petitioned the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry in the
spring of 1907 and successfully registered the company. None other
than Shanxi banker Qu Benqiao, whose prototypical mining company
was highlighted by Zhao Erxun in February 1903, was selected to
head this ‘new’ company, with operational headquarters in Yangquan,
branches in Jincheng, Datong, and Shouyang, and sales offices in
Tianjin, Beijing, Baoding, and Shijiazhuang. The Shanxi Merchant
All-Province Protect-Shanxi Mining Company, Ltd (Shanxi shangban
quansheng Bao Jin kuangwu youxian zong gongsi) built upon previous efforts
that can be traced, for example, to the villages near Yangquan, for
the old Tongji Kuangwu Company (and thus Guben Company) was
subsumed under this new enterprise and would become Shanxi’s first
Chinese-owned large modern-style mining company.79
While the student-led publicity campaigns were propaganda
successes—one 3 November, 1907 rally in Taiyuan attracted 10,000
people and smaller, but still popular, meetings held in Pingding in
October sought to pressure people to cease selling land to the syndicate
(even the Shanxi University graduates who had been sent to England
to study railroad and mining engineering in spring 1907 added their
protests to the chorus)—it was the Protect-Shanxi Company that
attended to the hard task of capital formation. Money was raised
from Shanxi’s network of bankers as well as from the people at large,
for there were occasional capital infusions from the land tax fund.
While this effort was going on, a delegation of people from Shanxi
visited Beijing, headed by the Judicial Commissioner (ancha shi),
Ding Baoquan,80 who had been summoned to Beijing by an imperial
edict of 20 September, 1907, to mediate an agreement between the
Protect-Shanxi Company and the Pekin Syndicate.81 Their efforts
paved the way for the beginning of negotiations in December 1907
between provincial officials and the Pekin Syndicate. It is clear
the syndicate appreciated the complexity and the volatility of the
79
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mining-rights-recovery movement in Shanxi. Moreover, it recognized,
however begrudgingly, that Shanxi’s coal was more than a lucrative
energy resource:
[T]he Pekin Syndicate, after discussion, having recognized the earnest desire
of the Shansi [Shanxi] people to manage their own mining affairs, has
consented in the interest of public peace, and international comity, after
full consideration of all the circumstances, to allow the province of Shansi
[Shanxi] to redeem the aforesaid covenants for mining, working of iron and
transporting of minerals, in order that the province itself may carry out the
work detailed therein.82

This was the first article in the agreement reached on 20 January,
1908 that allowed the Protect-Shanxi Company to purchase the
syndicate’s claims on Shanxi and take over its operations. The first
payment, half of a total 2.75 million taels, was to be made in
February; the rest was to be paid in three annual instalments in 1909,
1910, and 1911. Four months shy of the ten-year anniversary of the
original agreement with the Pekin Syndicate, mining rights returned
to Shanxi.83
This was a signal achievement. The Pekin Syndicate itself recognized
that this was both a local and global issue, and in a brief review of
some of the language used in the documents just surveyed we can also
glimpse a similar transformation of understanding on the part of the
Chinese protagonists of this story.
Echoes of the Past in the Language of Shanxi’s
Rights-recovery Movement
While there are continuities across the divide of 1900, there is a
striking difference between the Beijing censors’ memorials sent in
1898 and a similar group petition in 1907. The former make personal
attacks on concession negotiators Liu E and Fang Xiaojie, stress their
non-Shanxi-ness, and highlight their extra-provincial connections to
Anhui and Guangdong merchant wealth in Beijing and to Zhang
Zhidong. These pre-1900 memorials also display a concern that
merchants rather than gentry and the people are controlling affairs.
In 1907, however, metropolitan official Yun Yuding and Beijing-based
82
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officials from Shanxi attacked the specifics of the agreements and the
need for renegotiation.84 Clearly there is an internationalization of a
conflict previously seen in provincial and even somewhat parochial
terms. The post-1900 documents also reflect changing political
language. For example, the student petitions written in Shanxi and
Tokyo have a different language and tone, even though there is an
echo from previous petitions. The use of terms like guomin for ‘citizen,’
the trope about Shanxi’s coal resources being number one in the world,
and a more emotional style of rhetoric that can be seen in the Shanxi
student petitions and Li Peiren’s suicide note, are characteristics of
the post-Boxer period.
It is easy also to see these connections between past and present,
and province and nation, in the post-Boxer era as activists came close
to using the pejorative label of hanjian or ‘traitor to the Han’ for
anyone whose cooperation aided the Pekin Syndicate in its effort to
work the concession. Some even argued that such persons should be
banished.85 An extreme measure, but one that opens another line of
analysis that suggests the deep-rootedness of recent Shanxi history. A
similar kind of language was used by Chinese officials in Shanxi who
handled conflicts between Chinese Christians and their non-believing
neighbours in the years before the Boxer Uprising. Here the issue was
Chinese Christian refusal, based on treaty rights extended to them on
the basis of the extraterritoriality enjoyed by Western missionaries,
to help pay for, or participate in, community temple festivals. The
magistrate in the northeastern Shanxi city of Datong went so far as to
say that Christians would have to leave the country if they continued
to refuse to support temple festivals.86 Here, the connection between
community and a larger political entity was very clear.
These so-called ‘missionary cases’ (jiaoan) were relatively scattered
in pre-1900 Shanxi but the language and mindset became very
widespread and deadly serious during the summer of 1900. As already
argued, there is evidence that Shanxi was being mobilized for war
in 1900, with regular troops and local militia groups preparing to
meet the advance of Allied troops. Instructions came from Beijing
that foreigners should return to their respective countries and that
any Chinese Christian who defied state authority should be charged
84
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with treason and could be executed.87 But Governor Yuxian took this
one step further, influenced no doubt by his concern about Shanxi
Christians who might aid the Allies during an invasion of Shanxi.
To address that concern, which was shared by the people, Yuxian
issued a proclamation that called on Chinese Christians to renounce
their faith (chujiao). It seems unlikely that it was the question of
faith that troubled Yuxian in 1900, but rather a secular concern of
military preparedness.88 For Yuxian the goal, in the end, was national
defence, with Shanxi being a strategic key point. For those Shanxi
communities and individuals who had been troubled by the social and
ritual implications of Chinese Christian withdrawal from accepted
community practices, this proclamation was probably welcomed as
long overdue. Once the China War of 1900–1901 (of which the Boxer
Uprising was one element) ended, however, Westerners regained their
dominance and insisted on the right of religious freedom for their
followers. No Chinese Christians would be faced with such a terrible
choice again in the Qing, as it became increasingly accepted that one
could, in fact, be both Christian and Chinese.
How does this help us understand and analyze the language of
the rights-recovery movement and its connection to the national
project? In both periods we have persons who claim to speak for
community putting pressure on non-conforming Chinese to renounce
their connections to foreign interests. The presumption of the
Datong magistrate was that jiao (religion, teaching) and China were
homologous. While many in Shanxi may have agreed, this viewpoint
was becoming untenable, especially after 1900. But the template of
identity created in this religious domain was secularized in the postBoxer era. Just as it became understood that more than one jiao was
now acceptable in China, the exclusivity that could previously have
been associated with that term came to be attached to the new and
secular marker for country (guo). Loyalty to this new construct would
be judged, as it was in Shanxi, by how citizens (guomin) acted locally
and provincially. While all Shanxi natives were now legally guaranteed
the right to choose from among several jiao, they were also now being

87
See court letter of GX26/6/10 in Yihetuan dang’an shiliao, edited by Gugong
bowuyuan Ming–Qing dang’an bu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), vol. 1, p. 249.
88
For Yuxian’s discussion of this policy see Yuxian memorial GX26/6/20 (rescript
date), attachment A, Yihetuan dang’an shiliao, vol. 1, pp. 319–320. For a facsimile of a
‘certificate of protection’ given to a Christian in Yangqu County see E. H. Edwards,
p. 110.

http://journals.cambridge.org

Downloaded: 12 May 2014

IP address: 140.160.178.168

1288

ROGER R. THOMPSON

enjoined to imagine, identify with, and support one country (guo).
Tangible evidence of where someone stood was to be found in how
they treated the blandishments of the Pekin Syndicate.
In final analysis, localism, provincialism, and the national project
came together in the eyes of those rights-recovery activists who insisted
that Shanxi’s coal was for the use of the community, the province,
and the nation on terms established by and for the people of Shanxi.
Then, and only then, would it be acceptable for Baron Richthofen’s
dream of Shanxi coal supplying a world market to be realized. To a
significant degree these demands would continue to be met throughout
the Republican period associated with the rule of Yan Xishan and even
into the post-1949 period, when the outward-oriented but protective
provincialism of Shanxi would finally be subordinated to a different
vision of the national project.89
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